


THE FRONTIER

A CHRISTIAN COMMENTARY ON THE COMMON LIFE

EDITED BY
PHILIP MAIRET AND ALEC VIDLER

AUGUST 1950

Vol. I No. 8

BRITAIN, EUROPE
AND U.N.O.

•
IMPRESSIONS OF MALAYA

•
HISTORY AND JUDGEMENT

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OUR NEW CONTRIBUTORS

FRANCIS MAJOR, by profession an engineer, has considerable knowledge of several countries in the Middle East, and has recently assumed an appointment in Malaya. He has written articles on literary and social subjects.

MARTIN WIGHT is Reader in International Relations in the University of London; author of *The Development of the Legislative Council* and *The Gold Coast Legislative Council*; formerly on the Staff of the Survey of International Affairs Department at Chatham House.

MAURICE B. RECKITT, the Editor of *Christendom*, is a Christian sociologist and Social critic. His best-known books include *Faith and Society*, *The Christian in Politics* and *Maurice to Temple* (the Scott Holland Lectures for 1946).

THE FRONTIER

A CHRISTIAN COMMENTARY ON THE
COMMON LIFE

Vol. I. No. 8.

AUGUST 1950

Notes of the Month

THE peoples of this bunch of peninsulas and islands that we call Europe are a family of nations, if a notoriously quarrelsome family; and their fractious unity has been vividly displayed in the last few weeks. The sudden proposal of the French Government that France and Germany should pool their heavy industries mutually and with the rest of Western Europe was an attempt to hasten, by one long, irrevocable stride, the movement towards close political and economic union which has been proceeding in theory and to some degree in practice since the last war. This attempt to hurry the process has however raised a flurry of emotional disagreements and recriminations Britain receiving most of the latter for her refusal to join the party. Within Britain feelings ran high, and it looked as though the Schuman Plan would become a party issue until a Parliamentary Debate showed that neither Government nor Opposition were prepared to give the French initiative more than a conditional blessing. Britain has more to risk and perhaps to sacrifice by such a scheme than any of the other nations concerned; but the delegates of the six countries now discussing it in Paris also find, when it comes to detail, many difficulties in reaching solutions that will not land them in politically impossible positions. In view of the vital importance of heavy industry in peace and

war, would not such a plan amount to an unwarrantable sacrifice of "national sovereignty" to a "supra-national" authority? In this country its opponents say it would. Yet Britain and all the nations involved in this question have set up various international authorities in U.N.O. Whilst they dispute about the possibility of an economic authority, they have already committed the supreme prerogative of national sovereignty—that of declaring peace or war—to an international Council, have accepted its decision and entered into war with a Communist Government in the Far East.

Franco-German Reconciliation

It grows ever harder for any nation to preserve independence of action or even its distinctive ways of life under the many pressures of the modern world. For that very reason it is essential to know what things are indispensable to nationhood and whether sovereignty is one of them, for the liberty and spiritual welfare of man are concerned in nationality. We shall return to this later. But in trying to estimate such a proposal as the Schuman Plan let us first consider the motives from which it proceeds. One of them, and it is commonly under-rated, follows from the fact already mentioned—that these nations share a real sense of historic unity in their diversity. After all, up to but a very few generations ago, their sovereign rulers were all of more or less related families, whose habit of intermarriage was symbolic of a deep religious and cultural interchange that endured, disturbed but unbroken, through all their furious feuds. Another motive, which this sentiment reinforces, is the fear and isolation felt by a group of nations who see their relative importance and security diminishing between two great and growing Powers in the east and the west. Even if political combination into larger states, instead of ensuring peace is liable only to bring about bigger wars, still the longing of the common people for peace is directed first towards a protective power big and strong

enough to defend them, and Europeans were never in greater need of peace than now or willing to give more for it. One factor in the readiness of the French to bury the hatchet with Germany may well be their experience twice in a generation of life under German occupation. Enemy occupation may intensify political hatred, but there is another and more human side to it which gets less publicity. It is seen, for instance, in Denis Saurat's authentic account of his parents' life in German-occupied France during the war of 1914, a life of ordinary cottage folk who, with German privates billeted in their homes, discover despite their political enmity that they are human beings with far more mutual sympathy than they had been allowed to think. Very many more French and German people had such experiences in the longer occupation of the last war, for the groups actively engaged in repression and resistance were relatively small. This occupation left indeed more bitterness between the French themselves than between them and the Germans, and the war disillusioned both peoples about their governments : it has produced in both a greater readiness to respond to a European than to a national appeal. This may be only a mood : the idea of peace might not give them strength to face the cost of realizing it. But we cannot assume that Franco-German enmity is a permanent feature of the European landscape. The differences of mind and morale inherent in the two peoples are not greater than those between the English and Scots, and it would be hard to name a frontier more soaked with blood from centuries of fighting than the Border between the latter. If two such nations could achieve political union followed by centuries of satisfactory collaboration, who can say that France and Germany will never find a way of living together without war ?

Questionable Aims

Some, who gladly recognize these motives to reconciliation, see or suspect other and less reputable aims in the

Schuman plan. Like our Mr. Strachey, they think it would mean only a revival, in another form and on a vaster scale, of the kind of "cartel" by which private producers in different nations used to correlate their trading policies, simply to protect their own interests against over-production and falling prices. The suspicion is not to be lightly brushed aside: whether it is well-grounded or not can be decided only in the light of facts to which Christians have no special means of access and about which students of economics differ. That the outcome of the scheme would be an irresponsible body of predatory capitalists is the view of it which Communists have an obvious interest in propagating, but not a few Conservatives and others oppose the idea because they think that the British steel industry, already almost nationally integrated and highly efficient, has a world competitive advantage which ought not to be surrendered by merging it with others. They object to such a politically-sponsored cartel not because they regard it as immoral—the immorality of the old cartels was often exaggerated—but as imprudent from Britain's own point of view. This brings us back to the questions of national sovereignty, concerning which Christians have a distinct witness to bear, and of whether it is fundamentally different in present circumstances. To answer this one must go beyond the Schuman proposal, first to consider the moral nature of sovereignty, and then the attempts to pool sovereignties in such bodies as the U.N.O. to which a United Europe itself would be subject.

Sovereignty

Sovereignty means supreme authority, and to the Christian there is no such thing here below. God alone is the supreme authority over all men and nations. Every human authority therefore is subordinate to God's will, and derived from it. A human authority may be supreme over a certain area of the world or over a particular institution, social activity or business, and "sovereign" in that limited sense, but in reality the discharge of it is a *responsibility* to God.

Any nation claiming the right to obey nothing but its own will and pleasure is erecting itself into an idol. Christians are as clearly bound to resist such a claim as to respect whatever is, to their best belief and judgement, properly-constituted authority. It is all too possible for men to make a false god of the nation. Those who invoke "national sovereignty" need to be reminded of this ; but in the present case they are not thinking of national sovereignty as divine authority, but contrasting it with the mandate of a supra-national organization, and their fear is that the latter, wielding perhaps world-wide powers over the nations, is more likely to be irresponsible than a national government in its more restricted sphere. Or that it may be incompetent—this is another and perhaps equal danger, to which we will turn presently. Experience of international authorities—and we have not yet had much—shows that they are liable to errors both of information and judgement, which the extent of their jurisdiction makes the more serious. But experience does not thus far suggest that they are more irresponsible than national governments. That was not the trouble with the old League of Nations, and it has not been the vice of the present United Nations' Organization. These institutions have been too anxious to keep their team together to risk any high-handed action that their member nations would resent.

Responsibility

Whilst it retains this character of a free alliance, U.N.O. is nothing like the "world-government" that is being loudly demanded by some people who do not realize what a mortal menace to human liberty that would be. World government would mean the centralization not only of defence but of economics, finance and other vital functions in one system of co-ordinated institutions, a world state. The United Nations, is, on the contrary, an association of national governments in order to preserve their identity

and autonomy. They realize that nations cannot attain this security unless they establish the rule of law between States and accept the responsibility of enforcing it. This attempt to give to law between the nations the same effect that law has had between men within the nation, is however powerfully opposed by something bigger than one nation. It is opposed by militant Communism centred in Russia, which as it spreads engulfs nations in the same political system, regardless of all that the Western tradition has understood as human or national rights. When this system invaded southern Korea a month ago, and the United Nations solemnly denounced it as a breach of law and an act of aggression, we realized how heavy a commitment it is to extend law to the international sphere. We saw too, that in a free association, however vast, the ultimate decision can still reside in a single conscience. In the circumstances, the only power to execute the Council's decision was that of the United States, and by that nation's Constitution the last word was with the President alone. It must have put him to the hardest question of his life. Rarely if ever can one man have known that a question was of such consequence and dared to give the most obviously perilous answer. In that instant his responsibility was, from his own standpoint, infinite—which is to say he was responsible to God. But that is the nature of human responsibility, as it is recognized in the social tradition by which we are still living, sincerely or insincerely, in the West. In recent generations Western man has played with many theories tending to the contrary belief, that conscience is an illusion, and that man's will is overruled, by forces of circumstance, such as economic interest, imperialism, class-war or race—supra-personal pressures conceived almost like the dark gods of pre-Christian religions. But it remains true that our heritage is founded upon recognition that at every point of responsibility man has to decide as a free spirit. This has much to do with the nature of the nation and its rights as an institution.

The Nature of the Nation

We ought to be able to state, without over-stating, the place of the nation in Christian belief. Like the family on the one hand and the Church on the other, the nation is one of the normal means for the schooling of man as an immortal spirit. In the national life of Israel recorded in the Old Testament we have both an example of the benefits of nationhood and a warning of its dangers. It also shows more clearly than it can be read in any other writings in the world, how the nation arises naturally out of the family and the tribe ; how the nation depends upon its conception of God ; the opposition between nations and their meaning within the universality of the Church. It is in the family that men learn to live in personal relations, and in the universal Church that they share a common calling and destiny with all mankind, under one Father and one Head. But it is in the nation or under the state that they come to know that they are made to live as distinct persons under the law. The history of Israel after the Exodus, when the people who had entered Egypt as a family left it as a nation, is above all a dramatic exposition of the significance of the Law and the creation of nationality through the observance and the perfecting of it. (Mr. G. Kitson Clark, in his new book on *The English Inheritance*¹ gives a very lucid exposition of this in regard to the history of England). Through the positive law of that state the pressure of the Divine Law is transmitted to man in his natural condition ; and it is under a common law with other men, and in membership of a definite political community, that man learns his responsibility for the well-being of his neighbours and not only of his family. So necessary is this to the normal development of the conscience and consciousness of the human being, that we are entitled to regard the nation as a divinely-appointed institution, and to esteem patriotism as a natural affection which, like passionate love, has its justification in nature,

¹ Published by the S.C.M. Press. 15s.

its sanction in divine revelation and its legitimate part to play in the inner life of the individual and in the external order of society.

The Diversity of National Gifts

All good things are corruptible by pride, as we have often seen in the case of nations since the great nation-states arose and erected "national sovereignty" into a political absolute incompatible with all Biblical tradition. But the natural rights of nations to be themselves and to shape their own ways of life are rooted in the diversity of the Creation itself; the multiplicity and variety of nation states are a witness of the will of God that neither the conditions of man's existence nor his responses to them should be monotonously alike in all ages and places of the world, but rich in diversity of resources, gifts, customs and language. The very value and vitality of any one culture depends upon the co-existence of different cultures elsewhere.¹ Any world-organization, claiming either political or economic sovereignty, and using it to over-ride and liquidate the national and local varieties of living by imposing uniformity of language, law, currency and costume upon every people would be opposing the purpose of God for mankind. Already, apart from any such conscious design, the modern machine economy which tends so much to uniformity of methods and products, has gone far in the destruction of precious varieties of local living; and a continental or world-wide power that sought to impose its will by the same means could all too easily complete the dismal process. Much of the fear that is felt and expressed by an increasing number of people, that anything resembling a supra-national authority might finally erase the distinctive values of regional cultures, is really a fear of these other forces which are already doing so. This may be a misplaced fear, for there is no *a priori* reason that

¹ This point is developed in T. S. Eliot's *Notes towards the Definition of Culture* in the chapter on Regionalism and also in the broadcast talks printed as an Appendix,

would compel such an authority to disregard the variety and autonomy of national regions : it could even regard their protection as a special responsibility. But we now live in a world where the acceleration of transport and communications has reduced the whole globe to the scale, as it were, of one small kingdom of a century and a half ago. All countries have acquired ambitions which increase their mutual interdependence, although each is insistent upon maintaining its own independence. The task of adjusting the claims of independence to the facts of interdependence was already a recurrent problem of statesmanship before the machine age began ; economic, cultural and political forces have always been altering the circumstances of nations, if never so rapidly, universally and perilously as now. Nations are not fixed and everlasting, but temporal and changing institutions, always developing and being developed by their peoples and by each other. Their policies towards one another must needs change accordingly. At one time the best policy may be almost absolute autonomy, limited only by special treaties with others. At another time the right policy may be federation, or political union between two or more governments. It could even be world confederation, the effort to establish a legal international order and enforce it.

Britain and the Schuman Proposal

The Schuman controversy stands against the background of sharpening conflict between the economic interdependence of nations and their political sovereignties. The need to systematize international relations much more effectively than in the past has been urged or at least admitted by practically all schools of non-communist thought since the late war, and more insistently so since Russia's recent boycott of the United Nations. In this context, the Schuman plan has precipitated two outstanding questions—(1) Should the proposed re-constitution of world order be approached

primarily upon political or upon economic grounds? and (2) Should a European Confederation be formed as quickly as possible, without prejudice to the more comprehensive scheme? For the Schuman initiative is economic—a merger of Europe's heavy industry—and assumes that this would inevitably bring about a great measure of European political unity, in conformity with the general international aims of U.N.O. Almost the opposite opinion prevails among many informed and responsible minds in Britain. After the first perplexed and confused responses in Britain, this gradually became clear. It also appeared that the decisive reason for Britain's negative attitude is not, after all, based on calculation of national economic advantage, nor on the difficulty of reconciling Commonwealth and other special interests with the plan. These and other resistances are certainly present, but the fundamental objection in authoritative quarters is the considered opinion that such an approach must miscarry.

The Priority of Politics

This opinion has behind it a long experience of efforts to achieve effective economic agreements between the nations since the war, and a consequent belief that they cannot possibly produce results of the magnitude required by the Schuman plan. The complexity of the problems raised by proposals of such vast economic range are such as even an electronic brain could not contain; moreover, they seem by their very character to be insoluble without the presence of a power that is politically as well as economically predominant. The argument is stated in detail by Professor Lionel Robbins in the *Lloyds Bank Review* for July, and he declares that "the main forms of European economic co-operation, which have been proposed in this connection, involve, if they are to be carried any length, European political union as well." Political agreement must precede any economic agreement that would meet the case, and such large agreement implies

the initiative of a Power competent to take it. There is no European Power with this capacity. (One may perhaps reflect that Germany, which might have attained the other qualifications, lacked the necessary respect for law). The Atlantic Community, on the other hand, which is the effective nucleus of U.N.O., can be said to have been created precisely by the readiness and ability of the United States to take such an initiative on the political level. To that and the Marshall Plan we must ascribe whatever novel progress has lately been made towards the co-ordination of European affairs. If this be so, the nations conferring on the Schuman project cannot bring it to its desired end, either with or without British concurrence. That project and many other economic adjustments of which the world stands in need would only be possible under the improved conditions of international law and order which the United Nations intend, and may succeed in bringing to pass.

Power Under Law

This does not mean that some closer political union of Europe may not become possible. It suggests, however, that Europe's destiny does not lie in the direction of attaining a sovereignty of its own. With whatever ties peculiar to itself, this family of nations seems destined still to exemplify their individuality ; the irreducible significance of the nation as a normal and natural condition of human life, which nevertheless depends for its realization upon the sense of Law as a spiritual reality extending beyond the nation, a vision of public rights over and between nations. This does not of course imply the desire for a sovereign world-state submerging all nations ; that is a conception foreign to Biblical teaching, except in the negative form of the reign of Anti-christ. But the hope of a world rule of law, upheld by the power of the nation to which at that time the leading power is given, is one that Christians may legitimately entertain : their tradition is that power itself must be made subject to

law. If the foregoing observations upon the nation are correct, we may be glad that Britain, during its reign as the premier world power and the main prop of world security, upheld nationality as a principle; fostered new and autonomous nations, regardless of race; and even in her own territories extended national rights to Ireland, a precedent which has encouraged the nationalist movements in Scotland and Wales to make further claims which may have to be granted. The possibility of such nationalist devolutions, and also of new nations being born of backward peoples in remote lands, are now dependent upon the recognition of nationality as a natural right in public law.

This is not the time for fears that whatever authority may be set up to administer the law may itself become a tyranny. All powers are decreed of God, none is of man's devising; and it is an abiding duty of man to keep those who rule and administer in the fear and knowledge that they hold authority under the sole sovereignty of God and are responsible to him for its exercise.

INTERIM

Refugees and Expellees in Germany

The latest published analyses of this vast social phenomenon are much more encouraging, if still less than reassuring. It is now possible following up the efforts of the Conferences held at Hamburg and Salzburg under Christian auspices, to say that the outlook is far more hopeful, and that a practical solution is possible if certain conditions are fulfilled.

The remarkable fact is that Western Germany, which sustained the greatest flood of displaced humanity, has already gone far towards absorbing it. Comparison of the employment rates of refugees and of the indigenous population shows a higher rate of employment among the newcomers than anyone dared expect two years ago. Owing to the wastage of population in Western Germany during and after the war, and the high subsequent demand for labour, Western Germany would not have the man-power it needs without the refugees, and

would suffer a serious economic crisis if they suddenly returned whence they came.

There are still areas overcrowded with refugees ; in some they are more numerous than the original inhabitants and living conditions are appalling. The high average of absorption into employment (of some kind) gives no reason for complacency about the fate of the refugees, and it depends on economic conditions which may not last. Furthermore, statistics leave out of account the serious handicaps under which they work ; deprived of property, savings and furniture, without means to give their children good education and, at best, reduced to lower status than they left behind. There is a social descent, even proletarianization of large groups. But the majority of the refugees are fine human and social material, and to this, more than to the organized efforts made to help them, they owe the improvement in their condition. We now know, at least, that the problem can be solved, if capital can be found for (a) redistribution and re-settlement, (b) housing and (c) expansion of industry. Lastly there is need of an emigration scheme, to use the services of the excellent agricultural workers still unemployable—three of four hundred thousand of them. This can be done only by international action.

100,000 Laymen Expected at Essen

The Second Annual Conference for the laity of the German Evangelical Church is to be held in Essen from 23-27 August, under the general title "Rescue Man!" Groups from Evangelical parishes throughout Germany will attend and the final meeting at which the results of the discussions will be presented will be addressed by Bishop Dibelius of Berlin, Dr. Niemoeller, Bishop Lilje, Dr. Visser 't Hooft, and the Federal Minister for the Interior, Dr. Heinemann. The proceedings will also include the first performance of a new oratorio "Thy Kingdom Come" by Joh. Driessler and readings by well-known poets. A preparatory booklet for the use of discussion groups explains that the general theme of the Conference has been subdivided into four main topics : the freedom of man as person ; man in his environmental relationships ; the problems of the family, and the profession and the upbringing of children ; and, finally, the relation of the Church and its members to these three groups of problems. The suggestions for the treatment of the first topic include a fundamental consideration of property as the "condition of the freedom, independence and sense of responsibility of the individual and as a cure for massification (*Vermassung*)". How can the possibility of

personal thought and personal taste be provided in a mass-society conditioned by the constant pressure of press, wireless, cinema, and political propaganda? Under the second heading the vast problem of the uprooted refugee is the paramount topic. Why does he feel so much more isolated and forgotten in a village than in the big towns? Is it not a primary task of the Church to help the refugee to find a footing for himself and new friends in his new, unhomely surroundings—has the Church braced itself to this task with sufficient energy? Is house-to-house visiting of refugees left to the parson instead of being tackled as a service that the humblest layman and woman can render to break down barriers and prejudice and envy? Are we too lazy to remould and rethink our customary social forms and conventions, and open them to the new life that the refugee can bring to them? On the third topic the preparatory booklet has some searching comment on changed conditions in industry and family life. Work is either so exhausting and so unrelated to the family and its concerns that family life has become “marginal” or it is so erratic and, in the case of the many still unemployed (in West Germany), so non-existent that all joy and security are taken from a family life haunted by fear and want. Under the final heading emphasis is laid on the making of the language of the pulpit “intelligible” to present-day audiences.

Preparations are being made for 100,000 visitors to Essen during the Conference (except for the final mass-meeting in the Stadium they will be split up into groups concentrating on one or other of the main themes). Visitors from this country will be welcomed and full details as well as the preparatory booklet (a substantial document of 50 pages) can be obtained from the Deutscher Evangelischer Kirchentag, Essen, Rathenaustrasse 2. British Zone of Germany.

The Chateau de Bossey

The Ecumenical Institute, sponsored by the World Council of Churches, was fortunate in being enabled to rent the Chateau de Bossey, a few miles north of Geneva, as its temporary home. The building, a portion of which is of medieval date, stands in pleasant grounds with a fine view over the lake: and the imminent end of the lease was lately a matter for apprehension by the Institute's many friends and supporters. It is good news to hear that the Chateau has now been purchased and will be the permanent centre of the Institute's activities. This has been made possible by a further generous gift from Mr. John D. Rockefeller, which will cover the structural improvement of the building and enlargement of the accommodation it provides.

IMPRESSIONS OF MALAYA

RETURNING to the East to-day one is still conscious of a familiar atmosphere, colourful, odoriferous, dialectical; yet there are important differences. The problems of the East are no longer of purely local significance; they have become aspects of the total world situation, burdens to be borne in tubes and buses and not merely on the minute-sheets of Whitehall and Washington. And the East is fully conscious of this anxiety bred from the shrinkage of political and economic space. When in addition the return is to a part of the East, hitherto unvisited, of such obvious importance as Malaya, the experience is bound to be stimulating and exciting.

First impressions, however, are notoriously unreliable and unbalanced; the focus of attention darts about restlessly with each fresh discovery and impact of the scene upon the senses. The sole value which such impressions may claim is that they are those of an onlooker, not yet wholly submerged in a daily specialized task, and are not yet blunted by over-familiarity. But of necessity they remain fragmentary and incomplete.

At the beginning of any consideration of the situation to-day inside the Federation of Malaya and the Colony of Singapore it is perhaps worth while recalling the purpose for which the British flag was planted on the site of the ancient city of Singapura, by that remarkable man Stamford Raffles. The first was that of exercising a "wholesome restraint". "Our duty to other nations and to the cause of justice, no less than a regard for our national character, requires that the peaceable natives of the islands should not be kept at the mercy of every mercantile adventurer of our own nation". The second was the occupation of a strategic point at the centre of the area joining India to the Far East.

Raffles was concerned to ensure the freedom of the sea for legitimate trade. To-day we are concerned to preserve the freedom of the land, and the Malayan peninsula has lost

none of its importance. To-day it is ringed round by the new, scarcely stable and intensely nationalist régimes in India, Burma, Indo-China, the Philippines and Indonesia, with the old, but equally unstable, Siam tucked between. Given a firm centre in Malaya no doubt this frontier area with Communism can be stabilized in time. Without the firm centre the future of the whole of South-East Asia, and with it of the Indian Ocean area, seems precarious. That is the strategic importance of Malaya in the Far East front of the cold war.

It is possible, however, to become too preoccupied with this relationship between conditions in Malaya and the problem of stabilizing the surrounding frontier area. From this point of view the present "emergency" in Malaya is seen solely as part of the cold war and the banditry as simply an eruption from militant Communist China. This leads to some such time programme as: *first* put down banditry, *then* turn to plans for Malaya's political, social and economic future. Perhaps one's strongest impression on arrival inside Malaya is that such an analysis and such a programme are gross over-simplifications.

That the bandit forces are communist-inspired and largely Chinese-manned is certainly true, and as such they could be regarded as an open manifestation of the struggle for power between two imperialisms. But this is not the only source of the bandit's strength. There is also the insistent demand of the Asian to be done with tutelage, and from this point of view the struggle could be regarded as one for the prestige, power and wealth which appears to be in the hands of Europeans. Finally there is the communal aspect, which is closely bound up with the question of who is to benefit from any future economic and political development. Once this aspect is emphasized the communist-inspired banditry falls into place as part of the major problem facing Malaya, the integration of the various communities into a Malayan nation.

In the Federation and Singapore together the Chinese form about half of the total population, the Malays about one-third, and of the remainder the greater part have come from India and Ceylon. For the Chinese this is their America; they have immigrated to make a fortune. They are more energetic, of greater fecundity and generally better able to benefit from education than the Malay. Their superiority in commerce and among white-collar workers is overwhelming.

It is hard to avoid making comparison with the situation in Palestine ten or twenty years ago, although generally such a comparison is held to be invalid since the Chinese lack the religious and historical attachment to this country of the Jews to the "Land". However, the Malays have the familiar grievance that they, the indigenous inhabitants, are in danger of being swamped by an alien immigrant race of superior culture. In the past it was always open to the Chinese, even if Straits born, to return to China and no one could believe that their allegiance would ever be to anywhere else. To-day the situation is different, but it would be rash to assume that it has yet changed fundamentally. The Chinese business men and middle classes are undoubtedly anti-communist, but with an obvious regret that this now means being anti-China and with the inevitable wish that some means could be found whereby they could remain outside China, but of it. This makes it doubtful whether in this generation many of them can become wholeheartedly Malayan. If the banditry ended to-morrow and was followed by self-government based on equality of citizenship, the Chinese would be likely to dominate the country and the Malay would be in danger of reduction to a mere hewer of wood and drawer of water. This postulates as a fundamental requirement the retention of British control and the education of the Malay until he can compete with the Chinese if not in commerce, at least in the professions and in government service.

It is possible that the present situation will bring the various communities closer together, but alliances bred from a common danger have a habit of flying apart with even greater violence once the pressure is released. Certainly the leaders of the various communal organizations have recently made quite startling progress towards agreement. The Communities Liaison Committee has put forward proposals whereby most persons, irrespective of race, domiciled in Malaya could acquire a common Federal citizenship. These proposals have been endorsed by the executive of the Malay Organization, but as yet this agreement at the top shows little sign of being acceptable to the ordinary Malay.

The situation naturally leads one to consider our function as the people who must, in the end, guide and inspire this creation of a Malayan nation. Our position is once again complicated by the communal problem. In the spheres of education, both professional and political, and of economic development we are going ahead as fast as finance and resources allow. We are steadily introducing the framework of our own Welfare State. But the fact remains that we came here, with whatever beneficial results to the country, as an imperial power and with the intention of exercising restraint in favour of the Malays. Therefore, the Chinese may well tend to doubt our present avowal of intentions to unite the communities and ultimately to leave the country to govern itself. And this doubt may well condition their lack of co-operation in the task of putting down the bandits, almost as much as their traditional dislike of entanglement in the affairs of warring factions, or the presence of the bandits on the doorsteps of remote squatter villages.

Finally one must reckon with our own inherent disabilities. Are we capable of bringing these Asian communities together under present conditions? In most of us there is more than a trace of xenophobia and, although the Seretse Khama outcry has shown that there is general uneasiness on the score of racial prejudice, we still do not mix readily or naturally with people whose skins are coloured differently

from our own. We still close the doors of some of our clubs, a little self-consciously now perhaps ; we become impatient all too easily of processes of thought which we cannot follow and of lack of skill in the operation of the machines we import. Ultimately this is a situation in which everything depends on our ability as a nation to mobilize our spiritual resources. It is not enough to-day for us to offer to others political wisdom, such military and material assistance as we have, our culture, our preachers of the Gospel even. Nothing less than a fresh acceptance and presentation of the fundamental Christian attitude to all humanity by everyone of us will do.

FRANCIS MAJOR.

HISTORY AND JUDGEMENT

Butterfield, Niebuhr, & the Technical Historian

BUTTERFIELD'S *Christianity and History*¹ and Niebuhr's *Faith and History*² are so full of argument and instruction that it is impossible to discuss them in a short space without being arbitrarily selective. Professor Butterfield's book is unusually valuable : the credo of the professor of history with the widest range and the most agile and original mind in England to-day. If Toynbee is a morphologist of history, treating its broad patterns and recurrent forms, Butterfield is the histologist : he is our most serious student of its organic tissues, its fabric, its texture. We may feel a little regret that, having given us so much, he did not give us more. This book is an amplified version of his broadcast lectures. But about the same time he wrote four supplements for the last numbers of the *Christian News-Letter*, which embroidered the lectures without repeating them.³ More important, his inaugural lecture

¹ Herbert Butterfield, *Christianity and History* (Bell, 1949, 7s. 6d.)

² Reinhold Niebuhr, *Faith and History* (Nisbet, 1949, 16s.)

³ *Christian News-Letter*, Nos. 333, 336, and 341.

of 1944 has for some time been unobtainable, and it is the most notable historical inaugural since Acton's.¹ Instead of a collection of all his theoretical writings since *The Whig Interpretation of History*, he has perhaps wisely made a smaller book with a wider appeal; this means that there is still another such book from him to hope for. Dr. Niebuhr is not historian but theologian. His book is a criticism of modern secular philosophies of history, widening into an exposition of the Christian theology of history. It elaborates themes that can be found in the second volume of his Gifford Lectures,² but is so expanded as to be the exhaustive statement of his historical philosophy. Nothing that Dr. Niebuhr writes can fail to contain a great deal of wisdom and penetration. But it must be said that unhappily this is the most ill written and badly produced book he has published, and the reader follows the Niebuhrian dialectic with difficulty along a path that is stony with jargon and misprints.³

¹ *The Study of Modern History*, an inaugural lecture delivered at Cambridge on 14 November, 1944 (Bell, 1944)

² Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, volume ii, *Human Destiny* (Nisbet, 1943.)

³ "History," he says, "is . . . comprised of causalities and sequences coherences and structures which are not easily comprehended as meaningful" (p. 63). His book likewise abounds with these monsters, and they are not easily understood. Here is a bad example of the style: "The significance of the two facts, (1) that it comprehends the whole history of Christianity as a 'high' religion is partly derived from and not only the story of a particular people in its universe of meaning, and (2) that it deals with the problems of evil ultimately and not merely from the standpoint of what may appear to be evil to a particular individual or collective agent in human history in the actions of competitors and foes" (p. 24). After several readings one is not sure whether writing like this is due to the original sin of the manuscript or to the actual sin of the compositor. There are far more misprints throughout the book than is tolerable in a scholarly work. The English language has no plural spelt "catastrophies"; a sense of humour or of typographical propriety might have avoided the expression "His Majesty" in connection with God; the old joke comes true, "for 'immorality' read 'immortality' throughout."

Butterfield's theme is the relationship between Christianity and the work of the modern academic historian, which he calls technical history. His argument advances on two fronts. He recalls Christianity to the Old Testament or prophetic interpretation of history, with its belief in the sinfulness of human nature, in cataclysm and tragic conflict, in judgement and providence. At the same time he argues that academic or technical history is neutral, being limited to "the mere concrete study of the workings of events", and valid irrespective of first principles and fundamental beliefs (pp. 19-21, 126-8). As to our interpretation of history, it "rests finally on our interpretation of our most private experience of life, and stands as merely an extension to it" (p. 107; cf. p. 22). Interpretation takes over where technical history leaves off: "our interpretation is a thing which we bring to our history and superimpose upon it. . . . We cannot say that we obtained it as technical historians by inescapable inferences from the purely historical evidence" (p. 23). Nevertheless, as the argument develops we have the feeling that it has proved difficult to separate principles from technique, and that prophecy keeps on seeping through into academic history. Let us examine three questions that Butterfield raises: 1. Is historical study essentially concerned with the personal actions of individuals? 2. Is a moral pattern discernible in the historical process? 3. What part does judgement play in the historian's function? These questions are cardinal for any philosophy of history, and they are points where Niebuhr, who is concerned with the interpretation of history, throws light on Butterfield's argument, which is concerned primarily with historiography or what the historian does.

"History," says Butterfield, "deals with the drama of human life as the affair of individual personalities, possessing self-consciousness, intellect and freedom. . . . All the partial systematizations of the past—all those histories which are bleak diagrams of developing structures, or mechanical expositions of social change—need to be perpetually referred back to the unbroken web of ordinary human history, to the

full wild, prodigal, complicated story of the actions of innumerable people. . . . The historian begins, then, with a higher estimate of the status of personality than thinkers in some other fields, just as Christianity itself does when it sees each individual as a creature of eternal moment" (pp. 26, 27-8, 29). Many of the great historians have held a similar view. Maitland praised Stubbs for this very reason, and in words which applied with equal force to himself: "While the institutions grow and decay under our eyes we are never allowed to forget that this process of evolution and dissolution consists of the acts of human beings, and that acts done by nameable men, by kings and statesmen and reformers, memorable acts done at assignable points in time and space, are the concrete forms in which the invisible forces and tendencies are displayed."¹ Tawney has said that the supreme interest of economic history lies "in the clue it offers to the development of those dimly conceived presuppositions as to social expediency which influence the actions not only of statesmen, but of humble individuals and classes".² None the less, the difference between political, institutional, and economic history is partly defined by a widening of the historian's focus of interest, which blurs the affairs of individual personalities as other things are brought within the field of vision. When Professor Namier analyses the structure of politics in the reign of George III, and Professor Neale does the same for the Elizabethan House of Commons, they are engaged in a degree of abstraction which, while it is founded upon the records of innumerable individuals, concentrates the historical attention not upon the individual but on his political and social context, and aims at the imaginative re-creation of an institution. The economic and social historian attains a further degree of abstraction; he is concerned with the interaction of society

¹ F. W. Maitland, "William Stubbs, Bishop of Oxford," *Collected Papers*, iii. 504.

² R. H. Tawney, *The Agrarian Problem in the Sixteenth Century*, p. vii.

and its material environment—with methods of agriculture and densities of population, with progress in techniques and movements of prices, with the migrations of herrings and the dessication of the steppe. He can survey history from a point (like the stage-directions in *The Dynasts*) where the individual becomes anonymous and indistinguishable, and rather than the study of personal actions he uses statistical analysis and quantitative description. Working at an even higher degree of abstraction is the prehistorian, for whom not only are individual personalities irrecoverable but even the societies he studies are anonymous, and who can aim at the reconstruction of only their material culture. But Butterfield's argument is in terms of political and diplomatic history: the examples of technical historical problems he chooses are the causes of the War of Jenkin's Ear and the working of a constitutional device (pp. 24, 126). He really does not tackle the question, which is profoundly important for the Christian historian, whether the distinguished scholar who has just written the history of the potato was writing true history.¹

Here we enter upon the indeterminate ground that joins history to the social sciences. The social sciences deal with the activities of the individual as a member of a group; to some extent therefore history belongs to them. The chief difference is that history studies the connections between events, the social sciences co-ordinate and classify them; history sees events as part of the time-process—*sub specie temporis*, the social sciences see them as illustrations of general laws and systems of causation—*sub specie quantitatis*. And it seems that the social sciences, seeking as they do to establish system and pattern, uniformity and repetition in human affairs, may perhaps in their higher theoretical reaches have a bias towards a determinist conception of events and behaviour. Niebuhr's book has an attack (it is one of his

¹ Redcliffe N. Salaman, *The History and Social Influence of the Potato* (Cambridge University Press, 1949.)

favourite topics) on the pretensions of the social sciences and of the culture they inspire. He shows how the applied social sciences illustrate the unresolved conflict between the determinist and voluntarist versions of the idea of progress—as when eugenicists find that freedom to determine the birth-rate leads not to a planned control of the racial composition but towards the elimination of the best stocks (pp. 91–2); or when psychologists who reduce human behaviour to a system analogous to physical causation are embarrassed by patients who perversely use the same reasoning to evade their moral responsibility of co-operating with the psychologist (p. 104); or when internationalists who set out to abolish war see the development from partial to total wars (p. 111). It is possible that the general theory of the social sciences provides the supreme example of the unresolved conflict between the voluntarist and determinist versions of progress: on the one hand they aim at bringing the whole of social life under human control, on the other hand they tend towards the construction of inexorable laws of social life, which may be laws of social decay and mutual annihilation (cf. p. 92, n. 2). Niebuhr also has a discussion of the similarities and differences between classical and modern views of history (ch. iv), which is one of the best things in the book. It is possible that the ascendancy of the social sciences, in one aspect, illustrates a reversion of post-Christian civilization to pre-Christian cyclic conceptions of human affairs, and that causality and frequency-distribution are only sophisticated versions of the ancient deities Fate and Luck.¹

The social sciences have made great inroads into the territory formerly under the nominal rule of history, and in the disputed provinces stand the economic, social and institutional historians, who are concerned with men collectively as much as individually, and with individuals as points on a curve and illustrations of a trend. The conse-

¹ Cf. A. J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, v. 412 seqq.

quent changes in the historical outlook have been proceeding for seventy-five years and have still not reached their term. It is only the most obvious example that what we know as the age of the Reformation is being taught to a new generation of students as the age of the Price Revolution. Butterfield has indeed supplied his own correction in his inaugural, which ought to be read side by side with *Christianity and History*. "History, which begins as a study of human beings—and which must never lose sight of its original principles—becomes more immediately the study and analysis of what (if words were only elastic enough) one would call the system of necessity which is ever at play over the lives of men. . . . The historian explains things by putting them back into their relevant context."¹ Modern historiography lives under the pressure of the social sciences as the modern individual lives under the pressure of society. The citadel in each case is the same: a free will that can modify the course of events. The gallantry and ardour with which Butterfield has now hoisted his flag there will rejoice not only the Christian historian but everybody who believes that history, as Mr. Beloff has lately said, is the true science of man.² But let us not imagine, because Butterfield is wearing his historian's uniform, that his act is anything but an act of prophecy.

It is, however, when he argues that "morality is part of the structure of history" (p. 49) that we feel most strongly that the distinction between the technical historian and the Christian historian is breaking down. "Judgement," he says, is "embedded in the very constitution of the universe", is "embedded in the fabric of history" (pp. 57, 59). "Whether we are Christians or not, whether we believe in a Divine Providence or not, we are liable to serious technical errors if we do not regard ourselves as born into a providential

¹ *The Study of Modern History*, pp. 19–20.

² Max Beloff, "History as a Creative Art," *Listener*, April 13, 1950, p. 659. Cf. R. G. Collingwood, *An Autobiography*, p. 115.

order" (pp. 95-6). But he does not altogether avoid the difficulties of this assertion by adding that the non-Christian must recognize judgement though in a non-providential form. The dominant tendency of historians in the past century has been to deprecate the detection of moral patterns in history. It might be said that the inscrutability of the historical process has been a dogma of technical historians. Some say that we have too little knowledge for interpretation. "Philosophies of history are many, and all of them are wrecked on the truth that in the career of mankind the illuminated passages are so brief, so infrequent, and still for the most part so imperfectly known, that we have not the materials for a valid induction."¹ Others, and this is the more ordinary view, say the reverse: that the extent of modern historical knowledge is so vast that nobody can master it, that a Toynbee or Sorokin who tries to do so is not to be taken seriously, and that the sound historian's job is not to look at the contours of the landscape but to scratch a living on his own patch.² And here the question of scale comes in. The more the historian specializes the less likely is he to discern the march of judgement. As Niebuhr says, "the larger the area of historical events which is surveyed, the more obvious it is that events in it can be correlated within a framework of meaning" (p. 132). Moreover, the moral fabric of history, like the importance of the individual, seems most apparent in the branches of history that have been least influenced by the social sciences. Judgement is hardly a category of interpretation for institutional and economic history. It is improbable that Professor Postan interprets the contraction

¹ G. M. Young, *Victorian England: Portrait of an Age*, p. 184.

² "The teacher of medieval history is often aware that, historically speaking, he lives in a world different from that of his pupils. They are busy acquiring the broad outlines and the great thoughts appropriate to the novice, while he, if his development has not been arrested, is absorbed in particular problems and lives among the original sources of his subject," V. H. Galbraith, *Studies in the Public Records*, preface, p. v.

of medieval trade in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries owing to a fall in population as an illustration of the moral structure of history; though his successors might come to do so. "The points of reference for the structure of the meaning of history in the Christian faith," as Niebuhr remarks, "are obviously not found by an empirical analysis of the observable structures and coherences of history" (p. 155, cf. p. 114).

Yet a belief in the moral fabric of history gives us perhaps the principal reason why Christian historiography must take a wider sweep than the affairs of individual personalities. It is the oldest crux of the prophetic interpretation of history that it is not applicable on the biographical level. The unrighteous flourish; judgement does not regularly fall upon individuals. "It is particularly significant," says Niebuhr, "that the interpretation of human destiny in Old Testament prophetism was first concerned with nations, rather than individuals" (p. 237). The rôle of nations and communities in a Christian interpretation of history is mysterious and intractable; Niebuhr has an interesting discussion of their moral problems, their creative elements, and their possibilities of repentance (ch. xiii). But even if nations and communities have no other purpose in history, they are theologically important as the dimension in which the moral fabric of history is normally made apparent, the vehicle of judgement whereby the sins of the fathers are visited on the children.

The question of a moral order in history is intimately connected with the question of the historian's moral standpoint. Here Butterfield's thought reaches a very high degree of tension. He asserts both that there is judgement manifest in history, and that it is not the historian's duty to pass judgement. "In the privacy of this room I may say that Germany has come under judgement for what people call her Prussianism or for her adherence to a militaristic tradition. I know, however, that I have no *right* to say any such thing, and I very much doubt whether it would be

within the competence of the technical historian to assert it " (p. 63).¹ It is worth following the development of his argument with critical attention. "The historian—especially as he shares the defects of human nature himself and speaks out of the arena—cannot say whether Napoleon or Hitler made the most of the opportunities heaven gave to each of them. He cannot decide which of these men is better or worse in the eyes of eternity. What history does is rather to uncover man's universal sin. . . . The historian cannot give a judgement on particular human beings that can be admitted as a final moral judgement on their personalities, save in the sense that he can say: 'All men are sinners' " (p. 45). This is good Reformation doctrine. But he moves to a further position. In the last resort the historian "sees human history as a pilgrimage of all mankind, and human achievement as a grand co-operative endeavour, in which whigs and tories complement one another, both equally necessary to the picture. In the last resort even tories and socialists are to the historian only allies who happen to have fallen out with one another. . . . Once battles are over the human race becomes in a certain sense one again; and just as Christianity tries to bind it together in love, so the rôle of the technical historian is that of a reconciling mind that seeks to comprehend" (pp. 91-2).

Hitherto Butterfield has distinguished between the technical and Christian historian in principle but assimilated them in fact. Now he is comparing them in principle, but in fact is defining for the technical historian a position which few Christian historians will share. And it is interesting to see how his argument at this point spins away from the affairs of individual personalities into collective generalizations. It is when we are brought down to individual historical acts, as Acton always insisted, that the problem

¹ It is to be doubted whether the Butterfield of twenty years ago, of *The Whig Interpretation of History*, would have gone even this far in the direction of passing a judgement

of passing judgment becomes acute. The Christian historian has no business with moral comparisons between Napoleon and Hitler, but he has to have a standpoint, however reserved, about Hitler's murder of the Jews and Napoleon's execution of the duc d'Enghien.¹ Whigs and Tories complement one another, indeed, but the conflicts of history are seldom conducted according to British parliamentary rules, and are we to use such a category for interpreting the relation between Catholics and Huguenots at the massacre of St. Bartholomew, or between the white settlers of Tasmania and the aborigines they exterminated? The Christian historian sees Christianity trying to bind the human race together in love, indeed; does he not also see tares as well as wheat growing up to the harvest? This problem of judgement pushes us insistently out of the historical sphere into the theological; not because a solution can there be found, but because there the problem can be seen in all its bearings. In the ultimate perspective in which secular history becomes sacred history, no doubt much of history's struggles will appear as the misunderstandings of allies; to be confident that they all will, may run the danger of presupposing a sentimental view of evil; how much will, is a matter not for speculation but for prayer. The Crucifixion can provide the test of our historical theories, as of other things; and if we bring Butterfield's principle of a reconciling mind to this last test, do we not arrive at a position like that attributed to the Cainites, who said that Judas was worthy of high honour, having co-operated with the divine plan and played an indispensable rôle in the drama of salvation?²

Nevertheless, anybody who has experienced historical writing, which consists essentially in the sustained attempt

¹ For an example of Butterfield's extreme moral reticence in practice, see his treatment of this particular point: *The Whig Interpretation of History*, p. 122, and *Napoleon*, p. 68.

² Tertullian, *Liber de Præscriptionibus adversus Hæreticos*, ch. xlvii (Migne, P.L., ii. 65.)

to describe the past, and can be found in the writing of a letter or a diary no less than in the advanced forms of technical history, will understand the truth in what Butterfield says. There is a tension in history-writing at its fullest stretch, in which the historian is both inside his characters, straining to re-enact their thoughts and see their actions as they themselves did, and at the same time outside them, seeing the context and the consequences of their actions, and passing judgement on them. And such judgement has weight and truth in proportion as it is implicit and held in reserve, being seen as inherent in the moral texture of history. The seventh book of Thucydides remains the model of judgement-making historiography. Towards the actors in history the Christian historian will try to be a reconciling mind that comprehends; concerning their deeds he cannot attempt neutrality without abdicating his status as a moral being. In the experience of this tension his thought will always be driven back towards the case of Judas. The finest thing in Butterfield's book, the point at which we are most conscious (to borrow a phrase of his own in another connection) of a "straining which pushes back the very frontiers of human thought",¹ is the perception that the historian is himself an actor in the drama he describes, and the writing of history is itself a spiritual discipline. The argument that our attitude to history depends on our attitude to life (pp. 22, 107) passes over into the argument that our decision about history is a decision about life (pp. 109, 127). "All the moral verdicts that we may pass on human history are only valid in their application as self-judgements—only useful in so far as we bring them home to ourselves. . . . Mere history books will never carry us deep enough into human beings, and our ultimate decisions must come as we move from history to self-analysis" (pp. 62, 122).

A common feature of these two books must be mentioned in conclusion. Neither treats of *Heilgeschichte*, God's plan

¹ *Lord Acton* (Historical Association pamphlet, 1948), p. 6.

of salvation. Butterfield restates the prophetic analysis of the historical process without the messianic prospect. He hints that we may be returning to a pre-Constantinian situation (p. 135). Niebuhr goes further, and expounds the doctrine of Antichrist, that the most explicit defiance of God will appear at the end of history (e.g. pp. 154, 225, 267). But it is strange that from all his Biblical texts he omits the great commission to the Apostles (Matt. xxviii. 19; Mk. xvi. 15). Here is the Christian historian's only guidance on the purpose and duration of history: the gospel must first be published among all nations, and then shall the end come (Mk. xiii. 10; Matt. xxiv. 14). It is only in this perspective that the dialectic of catastrophe and judgement acquires its full meaning. Latourette without an admixture of Niebuhr is sickly, but Niebuhr is sour without an infusion of Latourette.

In a word, both Butterfield and Niebuhr emphasize the Old Testament at the expense of the New Testament, and seem to undervalue the doctrine of the Church. Butterfield has a sharp criticism of ecclesiastical interpretations of history and the Church's involvement in power politics; Niebuhr stresses the Church's perennial danger of betraying its mission and asks "whether any fragment of the modern church understands as well as the prophets of Israel understood, how severely the judgement of God falls upon the community which is the bearer of the judgement" (p. 275). But neither sees the historical rôle of the Church as the instrument of the Kingdom, the bearer of sacred history. Neither has the vision, found in the Reformed tradition in Suzanne de Diétrich's *Le dessein de Dieu* and in the Catholic tradition in Père Daniélou's *The Salvation of the Nations*, of how the Church's missionary vocation is intimately connected with the process and tempo of history, because preaching the Kingdom is the only means we have of preparing and hastening the Second Coming. But perhaps Butterfield's argument carries us, though by a different route, towards the outer limit of thought where all history is

seen as God's plan of salvation. Secular history is the field of the technical historian, sacred history of the prophetic historian; in secular historiography the mere concrete technical study of the working of events is already pervaded by a sense of judgement embedded in the fabric of history, in sacred historiography the historian's prophetic interpretation begins to pass over into self-judgement. It is in the perspective of sacred history, if at all, that we can hope to see Catholics and Protestants, the Inquisition and its victims, perhaps even the Church as a whole and those figures from Nero to Stalin whom God has permitted to be its scourge, as "allies who have fallen out". But Butterfield, because his history-writing is more suffused by charity than any English historian's unless it be Maitland's, reaches this point not by looking along the line of time but by depth of spiritual penetration here and now. MARTIN WIGHT.

SOMETHING TO GO ON WITH

IT was a happy thought on the part of the S.C.M. Press to republish Dr. Temple's famous "Penguin"¹ in more permanent form, even though, quantitatively considered, six shillings may seem a rather high price for it. Few, however, will demur to this in a case where quality is so high; the Archbishop's book is indeed a little classic. It is good to know—what we might have been told in this reprint—that 139,000 copies of the 1942 editions were sold; if one wants to visualize what this means one can picture everyone at a Wembley Cup Final as being possessed of it. If every purchaser lent his copy to three friends the book would have had—perhaps has had—half a million readers.

Temple wrote his "Penguin" in the months following the Malvern Conference, when interest in the social teaching

¹ *Christianity and Social Order* by William Temple. Third Edition, S.C.M. Press, 6s.

of the Church had reached a "new high". Re-reading it, it is hard to realize that it was put together while the cause of western civilization was still in the gravest danger; nothing in its tone or its content reflects this. How far this is due to the serenity which was so conspicuous a feature of the Archbishop's manner at all times, and how far to the unshakable assurance of the English people not only that the war would be won, but that victory would provide the occasion for "building a new world" after it, is difficult to say. Certainly the contrast between the mood it partly assumes and partly reflects and our own characteristic *angst* in this "era of atomic power" is very marked, and suggests that a hot war without the products of such an era may be much less disturbing than a cold war with the prospect of them. If Peace had once her victories not less renowned than war, she now seems to sustain defeats still more calamitous.

Another reflection is prompted by the Archbishop's emphasis on the scope, weight and permanent relevance of Christian doctrine in this sphere. "The main Christian tradition", he insists, "carries with it a massive body of social teaching". Though few people nowadays would, one supposes, venture to deny this, it is not on this fact that stress is laid by the most characteristic voices of to-day, when we live beneath the dominion of the blessed word, "existentialism". "Christianity", it is insisted nowadays, "is a religion of the situation"; why should we trouble ourselves much with its responses to bygone situations? This is not Temple's approach to the subject. His treatment is throughout realistic and contemporary; he even provides in an Appendix "*A Christian Social Programme*" (the indefinite article is emphasized) directly related to immediate problems and possibilities. But for him the social philosophy of the "ages of faith" is fundamentally *perennis*; he insists strongly on the significance of the Just Price and the prohibition of Usury, and declares that "the ideal arrangement [for to-day] would be a revival of something like the medieval

guilds on the basis of national charters". Though "the Reformers never intended to produce such a monster as the Economic Man", yet "when the great opportunities for making wealth arrived, there was much religious teaching to encourage enterprise in that direction, and no accepted traditional body of doctrine to relate the new enterprise to the old faith". All this strikes a note which has become increasingly unfashionable in the years since it was written, when Christian exponents have become so eager to remind us (in the words of Timothy Shy of the *News Chronicle*) that "we are not living in the Middle Ages".

"We have inverted the Natural Order". This sentence sums up the position to which Temple is always returning, the contention that we live literally under "a wrong order" because our social evaluations have got the order of things wrong. As for example: "the consumer is treated not as a true end of the whole process, but only as an indispensable condition of success in an essentially profit-making enterprise". The Church must be ever challenging these inversions, for it "must not allow means to be taken for ends". Religion alone can fully discern and elucidate social priorities since *ex hypothesi* its "primary principles" are not abstractions but (as stated here) "God and His purpose" and "Man: his Dignity, Tragedy and Destiny". Nowhere has the social relevance of Original Sin been more effectively treated within the space of a few pages than in this little book. "From the beginning I put myself in God's place. This is my original sin But I shall bring disaster on myself and everyone affected by my conduct unless I can escape from it". And Christianity is realistic in its knowledge that only by Grace shall I escape from it, and that I shall never wholly do so. Having lost our Eden we cannot reach Utopia. Moreover, as Temple points out, we would rather not; "no one wants to live in the ideal state as depicted by anyone else".

Not the least interesting part of the book is that in which Temple attempts an individual application for to-day of the

principles he has been laying down. With almost everything that is positive in this programme the present reviewer finds himself in warm agreement. There is strong emphasis on the need for functional and regional devolution ; " setting whole departments of national life to order their own affairs ". Labour must share " at least equally " with capital in the control of industry, and not only at the top. Temple advocates the limitation of Profits, a measure now much more widely discussed than it was in 1941, and (yet more challengingly) a " withering away " of interest charges. He exposes the fallacy of the demand for " a favourable balance of trade ", declares it wrong in principle that finance should control production, and affirms that " we have reached a stage where the private manufacture of credit is become an anachronism ". All this, he emphasizes, is merely a personal view and no one is required to accept it as a necessary application of Christian principles. Yet I believe that in proportion as Christian public opinion becomes informed and explicit it will more and more do so.

Are there then no criticisms to be made of this book ? I feel myself that the Archbishop did not engage himself closely enough with the problem of how to bring to bear a Christian impact upon a sub-Christian society ; that he evaded consideration of the power of vested interests ; and that he was perhaps a little too apt to accept certain features of our over-industrialized and urbanized society without question (*are we, for example, " challenged to find a social order which provides employment steadily and generally " ?*). Though Temple does say that " the phrase ' mother earth ' stands for a deep truth about the relationship of man and nature ", he says it almost in passing, and there is no consideration here of the need for conservation of either agricultural or mineral resources. It is natural perhaps that the book having been written four years before Hiroshima, it should include no consideration of the place of science in civilization and of the rôle of the scientist as its agent. When the Archbishop writes that " some economic gains ought

not to be sought because of the injuries involved to interests higher than the economic", one realizes that to-day the problem is (or should be) seen to arise in far sharper form where "scientific gains" are concerned. But no one can foresee all possibilities or cover every subject in a book of 120 pages, and Temple certainly gave us here enough to go on with. It remains for us—very literally—to go *on* with it.

MAURICE B. RECKITT.

REVIEW

Christian Responsibility in Industry: Some Vital Questions, with an Introductory Statement for Discussion. Issued by the British Council of Churches, price 9d.

This pamphlet is issued primarily as a preliminary agenda for the appropriate discussion groups, which are being convened in many places. "Experts"—as the writers observe in their directions to these groups—"are already engaged in formulating these questions and thinking out the answers . . . but this thinking has to be done increasingly by people on the spot". One group already engaged in the task, the Industrial Committee of the Christian Auxiliary Movement, published some of its conclusions in March of last year, in a pamphlet entitled *A Christian Approach to Industrial Problems*. Most, if not all, of the members of that group were in managerial positions in industry, and their preliminary statements on the application of Christian principles to their work are concerned to a large extent with the ethics of the work itself, both the process and the product. The present pamphlet is, by contrast, more sociological, it deals more with human relations and with the political implications of a Christian critique of power industry, and also with its traditions. For, after all, this subject has been under more or less brisk discussion for three generations, and has its traditions, of which hardly anyone knows more than Mr. M. B. Reckitt, who supplies an introduction to these "Vital Questions".

We thought it useful, therefore, to submit the new document to the Industrial Committee of the C.A.M., asking for the favour of their

comments. The following is their brief summary of the views that were expressed by their members :—

The British Council of Churches has tackled a subject which is perplexing many Christians, but we shall not find an "answer" to the multitude of problems confronting a Christian in industry in a small pamphlet. It is no criticism of the pamphlet that an answer is not given. It contains statements about various industrial problems, but primarily the pamphlet puts a series of questions in order to set the discussion going amongst groups and individuals. This is all to the good, but so many groups in churches and elsewhere are asking for a lead about "industry" that now we have this pamphlet issued by the B.C.C. there may be a danger that it will be accepted as the last word on the subject and not merely the first.

For example, many involved and complicated problems such as Wage Incentives, the Just Price and Co-proprietorship are referred to in a way that might suggest that there are easy solutions which can be worked out. The issues which are raised are important ones but they are so wide that each one can only be dealt with very briefly ; this leaves a rather incomplete impression, e.g. on methods of reward and incentive.

What we now want is someone who will write more fully about some of these matters following further group discussion ; it should include some of the controversial questions which an "official" publication tends to leave on one side, such as what is really involved in by industrial democracy, wage structures and the structure of industry. We want to hear more about the Biblical conception of work and the Christian doctrine of work.

Are there problems for the Christian which arise at work which do not arise at home, at school or in other spheres ? The pamphlet tells us that there are such problems and that they are due to modern industry's failure to give man the conditions under which he can exist as a responsible being, and that this in turn is due to large scale organization.

Is the analysis really as easy as that ? Were the conditions (in the widest sense) of industry any better in days gone by ? And what about the large numbers of men and women who work in small factories and workshops and offices, and even those in solitary and lonely jobs ? The very large unit is not as common as is often supposed. There are 240,000 factories in Britain ; 220,000 employ less than 50 persons and only 4,800 employ more than 250.

The pamphlet does not suggest that we should give up the advantages of large-scale organization for a return to craft industries but it goes on to say that "it may be that we have in this idea of companionship in production the modern equivalent of the individual pride of achievement experienced by craftsmen in former times." While there may be truth in this, there is more truth in a further sentence—"the important point is to secure that people have a stake in their work". That surely means that the essential thing is that people should find their work worth doing; a thousand and one different things go to make up the worthwhileness of a person's work and most people would probably indicate quite different reasons for liking their job than the sort of reasons many of us would expect them to give!

Finally we are reminded that the individual Christian in industry, whatever his position, has a great opportunity and task and it is one of the merits of the pamphlet that it lays stress on this. "Christians need to identify themselves with the problems, struggles and responsibilities of a particular firm in a particular situation, as functioning members of that industrial community."

ERRATUM

C. WITTON-DAVIES, the new Dean of St. David's, who contributed an article on the Talmud to our June number, was named in the Contents as having been "Adviser on Judaism to the Anglican Bishop of Jerusalem". This was an error: the correct title of the latter is "the Anglican Bishop *in* Jerusalem", the Bishop of that city being the Orthodox Patriarch.

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